A low-speed electric scooter (LSES) is a common sight in some areas, but how are the riders classified for insurance purposes? In Goyco v. Progressive Insurance Co. the Supreme Court of New Jersey held that a LSES is not considered a pedestrian or an automobile and thus a rider of a LSES is not eligible for PIP benefits.
On November 22, 2021, David Goyco was riding a LSES in Elizabeth, New Jersey, when an automobile struck and injured him. Goyco subsequently made a claim for PIP benefits from his insurer, Progressive. Progressive denied the claim, saying that the LSES was not an automobile, and Goyco was not a pedestrian at the time of the accident as he was operating the LSES. The definitions used in the policy conformed to the definitions used in the New Jersey Automobile Reparation Reform Act, N.J.S.A. 39:6A-1 to -35 also known as the No-Fault Act.
The No-Fault Act defines a pedestrian as “any person who is not occupying, entering into, or alighting from a vehicle propelled by other than muscular power and designed primarily for use on highways, rails and tracks.” N.J.S.A.39:6A-2(h). The No-Fault Act requires PIP benefits for individuals if the insured individual is a pedestrian or “occupying, entering into, alighting from or using an automobile.” Goyco claims that the class of pedestrian should include LSES operators as LSES operators are grouped with bicycles in N.J.S.A. 39:1-1. However, the definitions in N.J.S.A. 39:1-1 only apply to Subtitle 1, and the No-Fault Act is in Subtitle 2, so unless the No-Fault Act brings in the definition explicitly N.J.S.A. 39:1-1 does not apply.
The Court in its analysis of whether Goyco was a pedestrian for purposes of the No-Fault Act, looked to the ordinary meaning of words not explicitly defined in the act. The first was the term “vehicle”, with the Court finding that a LSES falls within the various ordinary definitions of a “vehicle”. Next was whether the LSES was powered by muscular power, Goyco’s LSES was powered by a rechargeable electric battery and was not designed to be operated by other means. In prior case law a moped that could be pedaled manually was declared to be “propelled by other that muscular power” because the plaintiff was using the motor at the time of the accident and had intended to continue in the same manner. Nunag v. Pa. Nat. Mut. Cas. Ins. Co., 541 A.2d 306 (N.J. App. Div. 1988). Using the precedent and the facts present in this matter the court found that LSES are not propelled by muscular power. Finally, the Court used the ordinary meaning of highway to mean a public road and found that the LSES was designed to be used on public roads. All three elements mean that the LSES did not fulfill the requirements to be a pedestrian as defined by the No-Fault Act.