NY Appellate Division Finds No Duty to the Public for Event Sponsor

In a recent ruling from the New York Appellate Division’s Second Judicial Department, the Court affirmed a Kings County Supreme Court decision to dismiss the plaintiff’s Complaint against an event sponsor in a trip-and-fall case, finding that merely sponsoring an event did not create a duty to the public without control of the involved premises.

In Paden v. Brooklyn Museum of Arts, et al., plaintiff Francisca Paden was allegedly injured when she tripped over a sign on the sidewalk outside of the Brooklyn Museum of Art. The sign was advertising the “2018 CFDA Fashion Awards in partnership with Swarovski,” an event being hosted by the defendant museum and sponsored by Swarovski, a well-known jewelry retailer. The plaintiff filed suit to recover damages for personal injuries, naming as defendants the Brooklyn Museum of Art and Swarovski North America, Ltd., Swarovski Retail Ventures, Ltd., and Swarovski Digital Business USA Inc. Swarovski then moved to dismiss the Complaint, for failure to state a cause of action against them. The trial court granted their motion on the basis that there was no evidence that Swarovski owned, occupied, controlled, or used the property adjacent to where the incident occurred. The plaintiff then appealed the Decision.

The main issue in front of the Appellate Division was whether Swarovski owed a duty of care to the plaintiff. The Court, citing Smith v. Dutchess Motor Lodge, noted in their opinion that in order to establish common-law negligence, a plaintiff must demonstrate (1) a duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff, (2) a breach of that duty, and (3) that the breach constituted a proximate cause of the injury. Further, in citing Torres v. City of New York, the Court went on to note that “liability for a dangerous or defective condition on property is predicated upon ownership, occupancy, control or special use of the property.”

In this case, the plaintiff was unable to prove that Swarovski had any responsibility for the location and maintenance of the sign, and was unable to demonstrate that Swarovski owned, occupied, controlled, or made special use of the property adjacent to the sidewalk where the plaintiff had tripped. As such, the Court held that the plaintiff did not sufficiently plead that Swarovski owed her a duty of care, and upheld the Supreme Court’s ruling to dismiss the plaintiff’s Complaint against Swarovski.

This ruling demonstrates that although the sign on the sidewalk was advertising a Swarovski-sponsored event, since the sign was located on property that was not owned, occupied, controlled, or made special use of by Swarovski, they had no responsibility for the location of the sign, and thus, did not owe any duty to the plaintiff. This ruling establishes an important precedent by shielding defendants against actions in which they lack ownership or control of a situation, and emphasizes the principle that a party’s legal duty or responsibility must be proportionate to their ability to affect the circumstances.