The issue for the Court of Appeals to determine in the Matter of Estate of Youngjohn v Berry Plastics Corp., 36 NY3d 595 (2021) was whether in light of the legislature's 2009 amendments to the Workers' Compensation Law (“WCL”) permitting payment of schedule loss of use (“SLU”) benefits through lump sum awards, a claimant's estate was entitled to recover the full value of a SLU award despite the limitation set forth in WCL § 15(4)(d). WCL § 15(4)(d) limits recovery by a claimant's estate to "an amount not exceeding reasonable funeral expenses" when a claimant dies of causes unrelated to the work injuries without a surviving spouse, child under the age of 18, or qualifying dependent.
In this case, the parties notified the Workers’ Compensation Board (“WCB”) that they had agreed on a SLU award, but the stipulation had not been approved prior to the claimant’s death, which was unassociated with his work-related injuries. At the time of his death, the decedent had no surviving spouse, minor children, or other qualifying dependents as defined by WCL § 15(4)(d). Proceedings were continued through the decedent's estate and a SLU stipulation was reached. However, a dispute arose regarding whether the Estate was entitled to the full value of the SLU award or only the portion of the award up to the date of decedent's death, with the remainder of the award capped in accordance with WCL § 15(4)(d). The Estate argued that, in light of the legislature's 2009 amendments authorizing lump sum SLU awards, the entirety of decedent's award accrued at the time of his accident or death, and that the 2009 amendments effectively rendered WCL § 15(4)(d) inapplicable to SLU awards.
The Court of Appeals held that when a claimant dies from unrelated causes before a lump sum SLU award is entered or received, the estate may recover only reasonable funeral expenses and that portion of the SLU award that would have been due to the claimant before death.
The Court of Appeals explained that the 2009 amendments allowed SLU awards to be made in one lump sum payment, but that the legislature did not amend WCL § 15(4)(d) which limits an estate's recovery of the portion of an SLU award to what would periodically become due up until the decedent's death. Therefore, the Court of Appeals found that to accept the Estate's argument that the entire SLU award became "due" to the claimant at or prior to his death, would be to hold that the legislature implicitly rendered Workers' Compensation Law § 15(4)(d) inapplicable to SLU awards. As a result, the Court further held that if the legislature intended for a claimant's estate to recover the full value of an SLU award under the circumstances in this case, then the law would have to be amended to reflect that.