Under The Law, Rescuing A Pet Is Not The Same As Rescuing A Person

The Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division, recently addressed whether rescuing a pet (or a person’s property) manifests the same protection afforded to a person under the “rescue doctrine.”  See Ann Samolyk, et al. v. Dorothy Berthe, III, et al., No. A-3431-19, 2021 N.J. Super Unpub. LEXIS (App. Div. June 2, 2021).  Although pets are an important part of one’s family and strong emotional ties develop, the law identifies pets as property owned by an individual and the State of New Jersey, unlike several other states, does not extend the protections of the “rescue doctrine” to a person who chooses to rescue imperiled property due to the negligence of a defendant; simply, a plaintiff cannot obtain recovery under the “rescue doctrine” when the plaintiff seeks to “rescue” imperiled property or an imperiled pet.

The record in Samolyk, is limited to only written discovery before the trial judge required to file dispositive motions before proceeding to oral or expert discovery.  Nonetheless, the plaintiff allegedly sustained injuries—namely a debilitating brain injury— when the plaintiff attempted to rescue the defendants’ dog, which fell into a canal and needed help, by jumping into the canal after the dog; the plaintiff responded when the defendants’ called for help.  During the rescue attempt of defendants’ dog, the defendants called for emergency services because plaintiff needed assistant.  When the police arrived, plaintiff was laying unconscious on the dock with emergency services performing CPR, and when plaintiff regained consciousness, she was transported to the hospital. 

Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment arguing that the protections of the rescue doctrine do not apply for people seeking to rescue imperiled property (i.e., pets) and without the rescue doctrine, no causal connection between the conduct of defendants’ pet and plaintiff’s actions exist.  In response, plaintiff cross-moved for Summary Judgment for negligently placing their property in danger which “invited the risk” of plaintiff to save defendants’ dog.  Ultimately, the trial court denied plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment and granted defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment; the plaintiff appealed whereby the Court affirmed the trial court’s decision.

Generally, New Jersey recognizes the rescue doctrine which originated “as a response to the argument that one who rushed into danger” is contributorily negligent for his injuries and therefore barred from recovery; however, a rescuer is permitted to maintain a cause of action against the person whose negligence placed the victim in danger.  See Samolyk at Slip Op. 6-7. When New Jersey Courts have only applied the rescue doctrine, it was always applied when a person was injured attempting to rescue another person and not property.  Despite other states and jurisdictions permitting a plaintiff’s cause of action under the rescue doctrine against defendants’ who negligently place their property in peril to proceed, New Jersey Courts fail to do likewise; New Jersey Courts have never applied the rescue doctrine, and continue to not apply it, to cases involving imperiled property.

From a defense perspective, Samolyk teaches us that while other states may choose to extend certain protections, the importance of a state’s legal interpretations matter most; a strong stance from the state as expressed in prior cases and prior legislative intent will affect the outcome of an action.  Even through the Court in Samolyk acknowledged the plaintiff’s efforts to extend New Jersey’s interpretation of the rescue doctrine for injuries sustained during a rescue of imperiled property, the Court agreed with the defendants’ position that the Court’s past precedence does not permit recovery for injuries sustained during a rescue of imperiled property, even when the imperiled property is a loved pet.  Therefore, a defendant’s familiarity with a Court’s prior rulings and a state’s legislative intent on specific issues, which may differ in other states, is imperative to defending an action at all stages of a litigation.