In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff filed an Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County, which granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the causes of action alleging violations of Labor Law §§ 240(1) and 241(6), denying plaintiff’s cross motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability, on the cause of action alleging a violation of Labor Law § 240(1) against the defendant Franklin Plaza Apartments, Inc.
Specifically, the plaintiff, an employee of a company contracted by the defendant Franklin Plaza Apartments, Inc., to maintain its boilers, was dispatched to prepare and test the boilers for an upcoming city inspection. During his work, he used an extension ladder to access the top of a boiler and was allegedly injured when the ladder fell to the ground.
The plaintiff commenced this action to recover damages for personal injuries, asserting, inter alia, causes of action alleging violations of Labor Law §§ 240(1) and 241(6). The defendants moved for summary judgment dismissing the causes of action alleging violations of Labor Law §§ 240(1) and 241(6). The Supreme Court granted the defendants' motion and denied the plaintiff's cross motion. Accordingly, the plaintiff appealed the Supreme Court’s decision.
"'To prevail on a cause of action under Labor Law § 240(1), a plaintiff must establish, among other things, that he or she was injured during the erection, demolition, repairing, altering, painting, cleaning or pointing of a building or structure'" (Dahlia v S & K Distrib., LLC, 171 AD3d 1127, 1128, quoting Ferrigno v Jaghab, Jaghab & Jaghab, P.C., 152 AD3d 650, 652-653 [internal quotation marks omitted]). "'In determining whether a particular activity constitutes "repairing," courts are careful to distinguish between repairs and routine maintenance, the latter falling outside the scope of section 240(1)'" (Dahlia v S & K Distrib., LLC, 171 AD3d at 1128, quoting Ferrigno v Jaghab, Jaghab & Jaghab, P.C., 152 AD3d at 653). Similarly, "'[r]outine maintenance is not within the ambit of Labor Law § 241(6)'" (Byrnes v Nursing Sisters of the Sick Poor, Inc., 170 AD3d 796, 797, quoting Garcia-Rosales v Bais Rochel Resort, 100 AD3d 687, 688; see Dixson v Waterways at Bay Pointe Home Owners Assn, Inc., 112 AD3d 884, 885).
Here, the defendants demonstrated their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the causes of action alleging violations of Labor Law §§ 240(1) and 241(6) by establishing that the plaintiff was not performing a repair or alteration when he was injured, and was instead engaged in routine maintenance. The defendants' evidence showed that the plaintiff's work "involved replacing components that require replacement in the course of normal wear and tear" and did not constitute "repairing," "altering," or any other enumerated activity (See Abbatiello v Lancaster Studio Assoc., 3 NY3d 46, 49). In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact.
The Appellate Court properly held in favor of the defendants, reasoning that plaintiff's work was not protected by Labor Law § 240(1). Most notably, the Court properly identified the distinction between repairs and routine maintenance, as plaintiff’s work was correctly categorized as routine maintenance, and as such, falling outside of the scope of section 240(1).