Recently, the Second Judicial Department for the Supreme Court of the State of New York, Appellate Division addressed the question of whether a plaintiff’s premises liability negligence claims can survive a defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment when the claims are based on speculation in Julia Coloni v. Stino, Inc., 2020 N.Y. Slip. Op. 05184 (2d Dept. 2020). When a plaintiff’s claims are based upon a speculative dangerous, hazardous, or defective condition upon a property, the necessary element of “causation” of a negligence action cannot be established. The Second Department found that when a plaintiff cannot identify a specific dangerous, hazardous, or defective condition, the trier of fact would be required to speculate as to the causation of a plaintiff’s fall and injuries as well as other key factors of an action.
In Coloni, the plaintiff allegedly sustained injuries when she was lawfully upon the premises of a restaurant, operated by the defendant, for a luncheon. The luncheon occurred in the restaurant’s party room which had wall-to-wall carpeting. At some point, the plaintiff fell and sustained injuries. The plaintiff commenced an action in the trial court to recover for her personal injuries sustained in a fall allegedly caused by the carpeting in the defendant’s restaurant which was maintained in a dangerous, hazardous, and/or defective condition.
The plaintiff appeared for her deposition during discovery and gave testimony as to the accident dynamics; however, the plaintiff was unable to identify the cause of her fall. In particular, the plaintiff’s testimony revealed “she did not know what caused her left foot to get stuck on the carpeting.” The defendant moved for Summary Judgment before the trial court on the basis that plaintiff’s negligence action would cause a trier of fact to speculate as to the cause of plaintiff’s fall. The trial court granted the defendant’s motion which the Second Department affirmed.
Summary Judgment is difficult to obtain on negligence actions as the defendant must establish it did not create the defective condition which cause a plaintiff’s fall and lacked knowledge, both actual and constructive, of the alleged defective condition for a sufficient length of time. Though, when a “plaintiff cannot identify the cause of his or her fall without engaging in speculation” a trier of fact’s determination on the issue of causation would likewise be speculative. The Second Department found that because plaintiff was unable to identify the cause of her fall a jury would base a determination upon the plaintiff’s supposition which does not create a triable issue. Moreover, the Second Department found that plaintiff’s deposition failed to present any triable issues on the element of causation thereby requiring a court to grant the defendant’s Summary Judgment motion as a matter of law.
From a defense perspective, Coloni, teaches us the importance of obtaining all the accident dynamics and the importance of establishing whether a known, definitive cause for a plaintiff’s fall exists. If a plaintiff cannot identify the cause of his or her fall, entering the realm of speculation, then like in Coloni, then the likelihood of a successful Motion for Summary Judgment brought by a defendant being granted by a court is not mere speculation, but probable.